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     The standard interpretation of the history of the inter-war period is that Great Britain, by going 
back to gold at the original parity, made a big mistake because of the drastic and prolonged 
reduction in output that resulted from the deflationary policy followed to achieve successful 
resumption (Keynes 1925). This was aggravated by sterling overvaluation in succeeding years, 
which put the U.K. at a competitive disadvantage and reinforced the deflation’s impact on output. 
By contrast France is generally viewed as having followed a wiser strategy by not returning to the 
pre-war parity, then by pursuing an inflationary strategy and allowing the franc to depreciate by 
80% before returning to gold at a devalued parity de facto in 1926, thus avoiding the economic 
cost of deflation. 
     The  British  followed  the  deflationary  route because of the importance attached by the 
government and the City of London to maintaining credibility in the bond markets. It was 
generally believed that a restoration of the pre-war parity would allow the City of London to 
regain its pre-war position as the center of international finance – in modern terms to follow the 
gold standard contingent rule.  
     Recent interpretations of the macroeconomic history of Britain reinforce these arguments and 
cast some doubt on the classic Keynesian story. They first demonstrate the importance of the 
reputational argument, showing that a country following the gold standard rule gains by paying 
durably lower interest rates (Bordo and Kydland 1995). They also discuss the reasons for high 
unemployment: in contrast to those attributing it to deficient aggregate demand (e.g. Thomas, 
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1981), they consider that it mostly reflected an increase in labor-market rigidities and high 
unemployment benefits (Benjamin and Kochin 1979, 1982). Britain's balance of trade problems 
are also attributed to rigidities in its specialization rather than to the overvaluation of the pound 
(Maizels 1970 ; Broadberry and Ritschl 1995). 
     The  new  classical  reinterpretation  of the 1920’s has not been applied to French 
macroeconomic history, even if there exist some good reasons to do so: that the French 
government also believed in the importance of reputation to maintain its borrowing capacity in an 
unstable world; and that France had also been an important international financial center before 
1914 and wished to rebuild that position. So it is not surprising that after World War I many 
argued that it should follow a policy similar to the British for similar reasons. The costs of the 
inflationary process from 1914 to 1926 are also well known: a fragile financial system (Bouvier, 
1984); leading to insufficiently capitalized firms; a decline in the international position of the 
French financial market; undervaluation of the franc leading to inadequate specialization 
subsequently revealed during the 1927-28 post-stabilization crisis (Marseille 1981). 
     The purpose of this paper is to open the debate by asking why France did not follow the 
British example in an early deflationary policy and stabilization at the pre-war gold parity. 
Specifically we ask the following questions: Was it possible for France to follow Britain in 1919? 
What were the reasons or the constraints behind the choice made at the French Ministry of 
Finance to resist the Banque de France and the public demand  for a return to gold at the prewar 
parity (with the revaluation and the deflation it implied) ? (Blancheton 2000). If the civil servants 
in the rue de Rivoli, best symbolized by Pierre de Moüy, director of the Mouvement général des 
fonds (the Treasury), wanted to stabilize the currency without destabilizing the economy, did they 
succeed or was it possible to stabilize earlier at a lower cost? 
     In  this  paper  we  thus  concentrate  on  the simple question, could France have followed a 
British-style macroeconomic strategy beginning in 1919, the last point at which French prices 
were within striking distance of restoring pre-war purchasing power parity with respect to the 
pound ? What was the actual importance of the constraints (budget deficit, public debt, monetary 
overhang, political instability) that the French government faced in order to implement that 
strategy? 
     To answer this question, we simulate a simple model of the French economy in the 1920’s. 
The model captures the effects of deflation and higher taxes on the supply side through the effects 
via sticky wages on investment and real output. The counterfactual effects of a British-style 
stabilization policy on fiscal balance is captured by assuming tax increases, conversion of the   3
short-term French debt into long-term debt and imposing the paths of British interest rates to 
calculate debt service costs.  
     The results of our simulation suggest that even in the most optimistic case (consistent with our 
supply side model which minimizes most of the short term depressive effects of the stabilization), 
with superior effects on the real economy than in the observed British pattern, the fiscal outcome 
would have been dramatic – the debt to GDP ratio would have been much higher than the British 
level and would have likely been unsustainable. Furthermore, the short term benefits to France of 
following such a policy in terms of bond market credibility were not that great. After the de facto 
stabilization, French long-term interest rates declined below British levels within two years. This 
suggests that undervaluation and commitment to the gold standard were more important 
ingredients for low interest rates than the credibility that the return to prewar parity gave to 
Britain (and which was paid for by intrinsic macroeconomic fragility during the 1920s).  
     By contrast, a stabilization early in 1924, during the first Poincaré government ( which was 
subsequently replaced by the Cartel des Gauches), would have been much more easily 
sustainable. This was because the real value of the debt had already been reduced by inflation and 
the post-war monetary overhang had disappeared with the beginning of flight from the currency. 
We speculate on the consequences such an earlier successful stabilization might have had at the 
national and international levels. 
     Section 2 discusses the historical background with the aid of some figures. Section 3 presents 
the model. Section 4 contains the simulations. Section 5 describes a hypothetical 1924 
stabilization. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Historical Perspectives 
 
     During World War I both Britain and France followed expansionary monetary policies to 
facilitate war finance and their price levels ballooned, almost doubling in Great Britain by 1918 
and more than doubling in France. In the U.S., the major wartime supplier and after 1917, ally, 
prices only increased 70% (see figure 1)
1. Although the exchange rates of the two countries were 
pegged close to the pre-war parity by the exhaustion of their gold reserves and later by U.S. loans, 
free convertibility had in a de facto sense been suspended in the face of a panoply of controls. 
Once hostilities ceased and U.S. support ended, the franc plunged (see figure 2) ; only the pound 
depreciated less than what one might expect given the price levels, something reflecting 
expectations of rapid stabilization or a return to pre-war parity. 
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     Both countries used a mix of taxes, bond finance, and seigniorage to finance the war. The 
British were able to raise taxes more than the French and consequently ran smaller budget deficits 
(for Britain 69% of expenditures in 1918, for France 80%, Eichengreen (1992), table 3.1, p. 75). 
Both countries borrowed considerably and both followed short-term interest rate pegs (figure 3) 
whereby the central banks purchased short-term debt from the government and thereby expanded 
the monetary base. In both countries the ratio of short-term to long-term debt increased. The 
French, however, issued more bons de la défense nationale than the British issued Treasury bills. 
Also France started World War I with a higher national debt relative to Britain and, with larger 
deficits during the war, ended up with a much higher debt ratio (1.8 versus below 1.4). (see figure 
4)   5


































     To restore pre-war convertibility, both countries had to reduce their ratios of short-term to 
long-term debt to prevent a rollover crisis, to restore budget balance and to deflate, in order to 
restore purchasing power parity with the U.S., the only major country still on the gold standard. 
France faced a tougher situation than did Britain as it had more inflation to unwind, a greater 
budget deficit, a higher ratio of short-term to long-term debt and a greater monetary overhang. 
Yet by early 1919, according to Eichengreen ((1992) p. 73), both countries were within striking 
distance of restoring parity (the pound was overvalued against the dollar by 10%, the franc by 
35%). 
     In Britain, although the exchange rate was allowed to float, official circles expressed a strong 
commitment to resume gold payments at the original parity. The first clear statement was in the 
Cunliffe Report of 1918, followed in subsequent years by other official documents and most   6
clearly by the application of the cuts in government expenditures they recommended (James, 
2000). The key argument for resumption at the old parity was the need to maintain credibility. It 
was widely believed that this would restore the pre-war glory of the City of London (Bayoumi 
and Bordo 1998). Vociferous opposition to resumption at the original parity before and after the 
fact was voiced by J.M. Keynes in his tract The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill (1925). 
He was supported by other academics, by labor (but not the official Labor party), and by industry 
groups. Most of the opposition, however, with the principal exception of Keynes, was centered 
not on resumption at the old parity per se but on the deflationary policies that were adopted to 
attain it. 
          Although the monetary authorities wanted immediate resumption after the war, they were 
unwilling in 1919 to follow the requisite tight monetary policies. The subsequent boom (which 
was worldwide) was ended by a very contractionary monetary policy in Britain (in part reflecting 
the desire to return to the pre-war gold parity), in the US, and in several other countries in early 
1920, which led to a serious recession ending in 1921. Thereafter sterling appreciated close to the 
old parity by December 1922, but the appreciation was reversed and resumption was delayed 
because of unfavorable events on the Continent (the Germans’ refusal to pay reparations and the 
Belgian-French occupation of the Ruhr (Pollard, 1970)), the unsuccessful attempt by the framers 
of the Genoa conference to arrange a coordinated international restoration of the gold standard, 
and the unwillingness of the US to follow an inflationary policy, as the British authorities had 
expected (Eichengreen, 1992). By early 1924 the exchange rate began a steady appreciation 
toward parity. The authorities waited until the market had pushed sterling close to $4.86 before 
officially announcing resumption on April 28, 1925 (see figure 2). 
     During the resumption episode, British money supply contracted sharply between 1919 – 1922 
and then leveled off (figure 5), prices fell dramatically in the 1919 – 21 recession and continued 
to fall through the rest of the decade (figure 1). The British budget deficit declined drastically at 
the end of the war, reaching a surplus by 1919 (figure 6), as did the ratio of debt to income (figure 
4) and the British were able to convert much of their short-term debt to long-term debt. Long-
term rates, after rising from 1919 – 21, declined throughout the 1920’s reflecting deflation and 
the restoration of bond market credibility once Britain returned to gold (figure 7). The return to 
parity likely contributed to a well-known bad economic situation : real GDP and industrial 
production dropped precipitously (over 10% below its 1913 level) (see figures 8 and 9). Despite 
some recovery, they remained below their 1913 levels until 1925 and 1929 respectively. 
Unemployment also shot up dramatically after 1919 to over 11% of the labor force. Despite a   7
subsequent fall, it was never below 6.5% for the rest of the decade (figure 10). Accompanying the 
rise in unemployment was a rise in real wages (figure 11). 
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  France, like Britain, suffered recession in 1919 – 1921, seen in falling prices (figure 1) and 
falling industrial production (figure 9) ; but the fiscal deficit declined one year later and by less 
than in the British case, and debt ratios remained high. Monetary policy was relatively tight up to 
mid-1923, reflected in the relative stability of the price level (figure 1), high interest rates (figure 
3) and a stable exchange rate (figure 2). Fiscal policy tightened progressively : whatever the 
discussions on the budgetary figures (see appendix), the deficit decreased but didn't disappear 
before 1926. That delay resulted from discrepancies between the right and the left over how to 
trim the deficit, but mostly, until 1923, from the hope that German reparations would solve the   9
budgetary problem. Only with the German hyperinflation did the French realize that the 
reparations would not be forthcoming in sufficient magnitude to cover the costs of reconstruction 
and to reduce the deficit, and that they would be unable to make Germany pay.  
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     The relative roles of the political impasse and of the recognition of the absence of German 
payments are difficult to disentangle. On the one hand, the relative stability of prices, long term 
interest rates and the exchange rate until 1923 suggest that markets believed in the promised 
stabilization up to a certain point and that the German hyperinflation had an important role in 
modifying their expectations. On the other hand, the share of taxes in GDP rose from 14% in 
1923 to 17% in 1926, a jump that compensated for the loss in reparations and allowed the 
stabilization to take place (A and B bonds from the 1921 settlement imposed a yearly payment of 
3 billion gold RM, of which 52% would go to France. Given the fall in the real price of gold 
corresponding to the US inflation, this represented no more than 2.5% of French GDP in the 
1920s. Furthermore, the Dawes plan of 1924  only temporarily decreased Germany’s obligations, 
and could even have increased the anticipated payments since the 1921-1923 record had been 
much below the obligations). More than the political impasse which the conventional story 
focuses on, the markets anticipated a budget crisis because of the struggle with Germany. This led 
to capital flight, a deteriorating exchange rate, difficulties in the renewal of short term debt, and 
finally a monetary expansion by the Bank of France and an acceleration in inflation.  
     Poincaré’s Bloc National temporarily relieved the French crisis by  raising indirect taxes. But 
continued conflict over the distribution of the higher tax burden under the subsequent left-wing 
Cartel des Gauches government and the threat of a capital levy (Hautcoeur and Sicsic 1999) led to 
capital flight and a short-term debt funding crisis, further inflation and depreciation of the franc. 
The Bank of France contributed to the crisis by raising the possibility of a stabilization at a parity 
different from the prewar one, and by engaging in political attacks against the government 
(Jeanneney, 1976). The crisis ended with a second Poincaré administration, having the support of   11
both left and right
2.  The Poincaré administration ruled out a capital levy, reduced government 
expenditure, raised taxes, and reduced money growth. These policies restored price stability and 
encouraged an appreciation of the franc to the point in December 1926 at which it was pegged to 
the pound at an 80% depreciated rate. This tour de force resulted from a change of personnel at 
the Bank of France where the new, Cartel appointed, Governor Emile Moreau helped to convince 
Poincaré of such a stabilization. Long-term interest rates declined after the 1926 de facto 
stabilization, likely reflecting a restoration of credibility (figure 7), which was reinforced by the 
legal restoration of the gold standard in June 1928. 
     Despite the monetary and financial turbulence, French real performance (output, industrial 
production and unemployment) was generally superior to that of the British  (see figures 8, 9 and 
10). (Real wages also did not rise as was the case in Britain (figure 11)). 
     In sum, although, the macro-economic fundamentals in France immediately after World War I 
were not that far from those in Britain, the French chose not to go the resumption to original 
parity route. According to Eichengreen (1992), a greater national debt with a larger short-term 
component, coupled with a weak political economy, explains why the orthodox resumption policy 
was not followed. Below, we try to confirm that intuition by considering what would have 
happened to France if indeed the British strategy were tried in 1919, and whether the reasons for 
the inability to achieve resumption were mostly economic or politic. 
     One can justify our strategy by the following reasoning: the three speculative attacks
3 on the 
exchange rate (in 1919, 1924 and 1926) resulted partly (maybe entirely in 1926) from the absence 
of a clear commitment similar to that existing in Britain after the Cunliffe report. Such a 
commitment was likely a necessary condition for imposing the tighter fiscal policy that was 
needed in 1919 for reconstruction and in 1924 to compensate for the illusory German payments. 
We then consider whether an early commitment on the British model would have been credible or 
not.  
 
3. The model 
 
     From the above discussion, we know that the most important constraints on the stabilization 
decision were the public finances, encapsulated by the ratio of public debt to GDP. We will 
consider the economic and political feasability under the counterfactual scenario of an early 
                                                           
2 Poincaré’s political clout depended on his previous intransigent attitude toward Germany, which made it possible for 
him to abandon the expectation of Reparations payments without endangering his political position.   12
stabilization. But before turning to that scenario, we must more precisely define the stabilization 
that we have in mind. We then model its impact on the debt/GDP ratio through the main 
macroeconomic variables affected: the budget, money supply, price level, investment and growth. 
          Recent as well as past stabilizations (Eichengreen, 1990) usually require at least two 
conditions to be met: a significant shift in fiscal policy and a change in the monetary regime (in 
the definition of Sargent (1986). Both changes usually have a direct impact on nominal debt and 
nominal GDP. 
     We consider as exogeneously given the change in fiscal policy which was tending toward 
fiscal balance. Both a reduction in expenditures or an increase in taxes may be considered, 
although we will think mostly in terms of changes in the tax ratio (especially when considering its 
impact on the economy). For simplicity, we consider that the government can directly choose the 
tax/GDP ratio and the ratio of expenditures to GDP.  
     The change in monetary regime, in the postwar context, had to embody a clear commitment to 
the gold standard, as Britain had made starting with the Cunliffe report from 1918. Such a 
commitment implied that the exchange rate be pegged, exchange controls lifted, and price levels 
and interest rates be taken as exogenous.  
     We assume that the demand for nominal money is a function of nominal GDP and anticipated 
inflation
4. Actually, the M2/GDP ratio, which was growing slowly before the war, rose rapidly 
during the war from 50 to 70%, reflecting the monetization of the public debt. It then decreased 
sharply during the inflationary period of 1919-1920, stabilized shortly around 50%, decreased 
during the two following inflationary episodes of 1923-26, and rose back to around 50% 
thereafter. It seems reasonable to us to consider 50% as the level of the M2/GDP ratio compatible 
with the zero anticipated inflation that would occur with a return to the gold standard. 
     If, at the moment of stabilization the money supply exceeded the real demand for money at the 
new parity, a clear commitment to monetary contraction would be necessary. This would have 
had direct implications that must be taken into account not only for the monetary policy 
conducted by the central bank but also for the government budget. For example, since Bank of 
France notes represented more than half of M2 in 1919, and the Bank’s loans to the State 
represented 90% of its assets other than gold, a reduction in the State’s debt toward the Bank was 
necessary for any monetary contraction required by a stabilization (see table 1). We must add any 
such reimbursement  to the budget expenditures.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 We use the term speculative attacks because in every case the exchange rate overshot its purchasing power parity 
level ; it does not mean that there were not fundamental economic reasons for the attacks (except, maybe, for the third 
episode, on which see Hautcoeur and Sicsic 1999). 
4 We could not find any statistically significant impact of the interest rate on M2/Y during the prewar period.   13
 
TABLE 1: Simple monetary accounting 
  Banque de France balance sheet (dec. 1919)    Commercial banks balance sheet 
 Assets    Liabilities  Assets    Liabilities 
  Gold  (5.9)   Capital    Credits to the economy  Capital 
  Credits to the economy (3,4)  Notes (37,3)          Deposits (30) 
  Loans to the State (29) 
 
Amounts are approximatively what they were at the end of 1919 (see ANNHIST 2003). 
 In order to reduce M2 (Banque de France' notes + commercial banks' deposits), one may either reduce Notes or 
Deposits. Notes result from credits or loans created by the Banque de France. Deposits result from commercial bank 
credits. Thus, one may either reduce loans to the State (three quarters of the Banque de France's assets), or commercial 
bank credits to the economy. 
In 1919 M2 = 67 billion francs (37+30) = 71% of GDP. Suppose that a reduction of M2 by 17 billion francs to 50 
billion is imposed to reach the M2/GDP 50% ratio. It would imply : 
- either a 17 billion franc reduction in Banque de France' notes, which requires at least a 15 billion  franc reduction in 
the loans to the State (since its credits to the economy are very limited); 
- or a 17 billion franc reduction in commercial banks deposits (57% of their amount), which requires a similar reduction 
in their credits to the economy. 
- or a combination of both. 
Furthermore, the credibility of the stabilization would also require a significant reduction of these 
loans: first, because a purely contractionary monetary policy would inordinately reduce the size 
of the banking system relative to the central bank (see table 1); second, because without an 
important reduction in the note issue, the gold reserve ratio would prove inadequate. 
A last important requirement for postwar stabilization in the French context would be the 
conversion of short term into long term debt, because of the threat that non-renewal would 
represent for the public finances. This would have a small impact on the budget through the 
difference in interest paid on both kinds of debt
5. 
     Using this model, we can calculate the impact of the stabilization on nominal debt, which is 
the first step in our construction of a counterfactual debt/GDP ratio. It depends on the 
assumptions to be made about the evolution of money demand (and then of GDP), government 
expenditures and revenues, and the structure of public debt.  
 
      The second step is the estimation of the impact of the stabilization on GDP. Our estimation 
procedure was chosen to give lower bound estimates to our results. Since we will show that a 
                                                           
5  This may also have an impact on the liquidity of the banking system since it owns a substantial part of the short term 
debt. We do not discuss this here because of a lack of available data.   14
stabilization at the prewar parity was impossible in France, we instead choose a model and some 
hypothetical scenarios that would maximize the chances of  success. In that perspective, we 
minimize the negative impact of a stabilization on GDP by using a supply side model which does 
not place much emphasis on the impact of stabilization on demand
6. This also provides a first 
(optimistic) attempt at building an anti-keynesian interpretation of the 1920s in France. Another 
reason for using this approach is that we wish to measure the sustainability of the public debt in 
the medium run
7.  
     One methodological problem we face is that in order to simulate the effects of a stabilization, 
we need to take the exchange rate and the price level as exogenous, which was clearly not the 
case during the flexible exchange rate period from 1918 to 1926
8. This change in monetary 
regime makes it impossible to use existing models of that period like that of Villa (1995), which 
have a different purpose and which treat the exchange rate and the price level as endogenous
9. In 
order to facilitate comparisons, we nevertheless tried to be as close as possible to Villa’s model, 
and we used the same data. 
    Mainly in order to fix a few ideas, we estimated GDP using three steps. The first one concerns 
the real wage level. 
     A classic problem with stabilizations is the resulting appreciation of the real exchange rate 
because of the persistence of ongoing inflation or (in our case) of the price level. In Great Britain, 
the overvaluation (in PPP terms) of the pound in the 1920s has been considered to be the central 
cause of the economic stagnation. A central point in most discussions of the British stabilization 
is the role of wage rigidities in the transmission mechanism. We estimate the relationship 
between increases in prices and nominal wage inflation. In our model where prices are 
exogenous, wages must be influenced by price movements. Since wage rigidities are a short term 
phenomenon, we add an error correction mechanism to restore real wages back towards their 
                                                           
6 Econometric attempts to introduce demand into our model were not successful either. 
7 Nevertheless, we must remember that although sustainability is based on economic fundamentals, a credibility 
constraint could also make it impossible for the debt/GDP ratio to rise above too high a level (history suggests 200-
250%) even for a short period. 
8 There is actually a tradition in French scholarship that considers purely speculative attacks on the exchange rate as the 
prime mover during the French inflation of the 1920s (from Aftalion 1927 to Jeanneney 1991). Nevertheless, even in 
speculative attack models, the exchange rate itself results from expectations which make it endogenous in a broader 
sense (see e.g. Webb 1986). 
9  Actually, we must estimate the reactions of the economy during a flexible exchange rate period (the prewar period 
did not have macroeconomic shocks of the sort the inter-war has) and to simulate a fixed rate regime, which makes 
almost any model problematic in one of the two regimes. This is because what we want to measure is the change of 
regime in itself, for which econometrics is of little help.   15
previous level
10 (a mechanism provided in real life by unemployment, a variable so badly 
measured in inter-war France that we could not estimate it). 
     We then turn to investment. This should serve two different purposes. First investment is the 
most sensitive economic variable, strongly influenced by expectations of a recession, and deeply 
influencing aggregate demand. Second, investment contributes to long term growth through the 
accumulation of capital. In a very classic way, we will consider that it is influenced by factor 
prices. The government deficit is added because in the absence of monetary finance a deficit may 
crowd-out private securities issues in the capital market, an effect which is frequently 
underestimated in an open-economy context by the impact of interest rates.  
     Finally, we add to this the variation of the tax ratio (taxes/GDP), under two possible rationales. 
The first, in our supply side perspective, posits a negative effect of taxes on firms
11. This could 
affect investment through capital market imperfections creating a role for retained earnings in 
investment
12. But, since what we are mostly interested in is the impact of budget deficits on the 
public debt, we can also consider it in a Keynesian perspective, in which tax increases are 
equivalent (in their effect on the deficit, under simplifying hypotheses) to cuts in expenditures, 
which negatively affect demand expectations.  
     Thus investment is driven by variables which are all exogenous in our stabilization scenario: 
prices (via nominal wages
13); interest rates (capital controls never succeeded in our period, so that 
the interest rate was determined as the world interest rate plus expectations of exchange rate 
changes under the hypothesis of uncovered interest rate parity); and fiscal policy. 
     From  investment,  we  calculated  total  capital using a simple accounting procedure (which 
coefficients were also estimated). We then estimated GDP introducing both the capital stock (in 
order to introduce supply side accumulation effects) and investment (in order to introduce short 
term fluctuations). We add past GDP, which allows us to include the impact of a delay required to 
return the capital stock to full employment after the war. We do not include unemployment or the 
labor force because of the difficulty of estimating a Philips curve with that period's data. 
     The model can be summarized in the following way : 
                                                           
10 We should take into account productivity growth, but after the war, it probably converged towards its prewar level, 
which is implicitly assumed here. 
11 Actually, most increases in taxes during that period affected firms disproportionately, either through direct taxes on 
profits or indirectly on dividends (Grotard and Hautcoeur 2001). 
12 At least in the medium run, taxation may have an impact on investment only if it redistributes from the productive 
towards the unproductive sectors of the population (to use terms used by contemporaries) and then increases production 
costs. As we estimate the impact of taxation using the overall government receipts/GDP ratio, we may overestimate the 
impact of taxation on business if the tax policy that would have been undertaken together with an early stabilization 
would have been less biased against firms or revenues from productive activities. 
13 Because wages were actually endogenous, we considered previous period wages for the estimation. However, 
directly introducing the level of wages would have led us to mix demand with supply effects   16
w = w (p, Dev-1) 
Ir = k (Def ; Dev-1 ; r , T) 
Yr = y (Yr-1 ; K, Ir) 
     Where w represents nominal wages, Dev is the relative deviation of nominal wages relative to 
prices since 1913
14 (assumed to represent the error correction term necessary to restore real wages 
toward their prewar level in the medium run
15), K the real capital stock, r the long term real 
interest rate, Def the government deficit (as a percentage of GDP it is supposed to reflect capital 
market direct crowding-out of private investment), T/Y the ratio of government tax revenue to Y 
(nominal GDP), Yr real GDP. When no subscript is added, variables are for the current year.  
     The estimation results
16 are presented in table 2 (ordinary least squares; t-stat in parenthesis): 
                                                           
14 If w and p are measured in terms of two indices based on 1913, Devt = wt/pt. 
15 This neglects productivity growth. This is not very important for the initial years, and partly explains the 
underestimation of GDP in the long term in our simulations. We did not find any solution that would allow us to 
explicitly introduce productivity growth. 
16 As discussed above, it was not clear whether to estimate the behavior of the economy over the prewar period (one of 
a fixed exchange rate) or over the inter-war (one including important macroeconomic shocks). Estimation of the 
nominal wages equation was impossible in the prewar period because productivity variations dominated purely nominal 
ones during that gold standard anchored economy. We estimated it over the inter-war (results including both inter-war 
and prewar periods are similar). The equation on capital accumulation and the production function were estimated for 
the 1896-1939 period. The results did not differ much from one period to another.   17
 
Table 2 : Estimation of the real side model 
 
Short term wage variations (all variables in growth rates):  
W = 1.09 + 0.83 P
+ + 0.33 P
- - 15.31 Dev-1                                                                    R2=0.77 DW=2.04 
       (1.2)     (9.4)  (0.9)    (1.8) 
 
Investment (all variables in growth rates) : 
 
Ir=  0.038 - 0.38 Dev-1 - 0.0069 r - 1.83 Def/Y - 1.07 (T/Y)                  R2=0.55  DW=2.1 
      (1.8)       (1.5)    (3.3)      (2.3)             (3.1) 
 
 
GDP (in logs) : 
 
Yr = 1.14 + 0.6 Yr-1 + 0.15 K +0.1 Ir                                                                  R
2=0.94   DW=2.2 
        (4.5)   (6.2)        (2.6)     (3.5) 
 




4. The simulation 
 
  We want to estimate the impact of an early stabilization (on the British model) on the 
French economy. From the above discussion, we know that the only moment after the war when 
the return to prewar parity was still possible was 1919, before the increase in prices that made the 
gap too large. Was such a stabilization historically possible ? The macroeconomic answer to this 
question is the reason for this section. Politically, the answer is most likely no : although 
everyone agreed on the return to prewar parity, no schedule was discussed, and the monetary 
committee appointed in April 1918 did not have the political clout the Cunliffe committee had 
(Mouré, 2002 : 40).  
     One could still hypothesize, however, that a joint stabilization could have been a choice for 
France and Britain if they had wished to manage postwar Europe in a cooperative manner. If they   18
had announced early in 1919 that they would rapidly return together to the prewar gold parity and 
immediately stabilize the franc-pound parity at its prewar level, the signal would have been 
powerful, and we believe it would have alleviated overvaluation in Britain and inflation pressures 
in France. Such a solution was never contemplated: the pegging of the franc to the dollar through 
credits from the allies ceased on March 14th, 1919, starting the depreciation of the franc and 
French inflation
17.  
     What we must consider here however is whether a unilateral French stabilization in 1919 
would have been prevented by the size of the public debt. 
     In order to answer that question, we must simulate the model presented above using the data 
from the early 1920s. But before doing so, we present our main assumptions concerning the 
exogenous variables of the model. 
     First, as a result of the choice of the monetary regime, we assume that the franc would have 
been fixed at its prewar parity with sterling
18. With free capital flows between the two countries, 
interest rates and price levels would then be the same in both countries
19. We assume that France 
would have acted as a follower and would have imported British prices and interest rates. With 
expected inflation eliminated, we assume, as discussed above, that the demand for money would 
be restored to its prewar level of 50% of GDP
20. With prices given and an estimate of the path of 
real GDP, we could easily find the level of the money stock and then the necessary adjustment for 
the money supply, that is the amount of Banque de France's loans to the State which needed to be 
reimbursed. Needless to say, the relationship between the Banque and the government did not 
quite work that way. The government had to commit to reimburse the Banque (Mouré, 2002: 47), 
indeed, the François-Marsal agreements signed in December 1920 between the Banque and the 
government served just that purpose. They incorporated a promise to retire 2 billion francs a year 
from the loans.  
          One may consider that an earlier and more serious stabilization decision would have 
incorporated a stricter commitment. Furthermore, 2 billion francs were not enough to give 
                                                           
17 This reflected growing American isolationism and Britain's erroneous fear that France could become a dominant 
power in Europe, when it was actually harmed much more by the war than was Germany, see e.g. Duroselle (1993 : 
19).  
18 This assumption has the advantage of being more plausible than a peg with the dollar (which had not yet the same 
prestige as the pound) ; alternatively, one may consider that France choose a policy similar to the British one. 
19  These assumptions are optimistic because before World War 1 interest rates in France were usually slightly higher 
than in Britain, and because the level of the debt was higher in France at the end of the war, making a higher risk 
premium likely. The assumption on prices is also optimistic since with greater amounts of wartime destruction, of 
foreign debt and of government domestic debt, France would probably require lower prices to maintain the real 
exchange rate at equilibrium. 
20 In Britain, the money stock in the early 1920s reached higher values relative to GDP than before the war, which may 
be attributed to expected deflation. Nevertheless, France started with a high monetary overhang, which was not the case 
in Britain, so that we do not think that France could have benefited from such a high demand for money.   19
credibility to a stabilization decision taken in 1919. An M2/GDP ratio of 50% (in line with the 
prewar level) would then require such a sharp reduction in private bank money as to put the 
banking system in danger. A simple calculation (such as explained in table 3) shows that 
commercial bank deposits could decrease by considerable amounts in order for M2 to follow a 
credible path (which we consider as reaching 50% of GDP within 4 years, a delay which by itself 
requires some credibility). This holds even if the reimbursements of the State's loans are given a 
higher value of 3 billion francs a year, which, we take as a minimum. We thus assume  that the 
government would have repaid 3 billion francs a year by increasing its long term borrowing. Such 
an amount, if accompanied by a similar reduction in note issue, would also permit the Banque to 
reach a cover ratio of 35% within the same time frame
21, a condition for a successful stabilization. 
 
   
Table 3: The four year impact on M2 of stabilization under two assumptions on growth. 
 
We assume stabilization of the growth rate of M2 by one half in 1919, thanks to loans to the State and 
growth of the note issue by half its actual rate (this is consistent with our other assumptions on growth and 
an early stabilization decision). This gives a 58 billion franc value for M2 in 1919, of which notes represent 
33 billion. If the rate of growth of GDP follows its actual path (no impact of stabilization on growth), the 
50% of GDP ratio produces an M2 level of 44 billion francs in 1923, a 14 billion (24%) reduction from 
1919. If  French GDP were to grow as it did in Britain, M2 must reach 32 billion francs in 1923. Below we 
calculate the impact on private bank's deposits if there were no decrease in the note issue and if 3 billion 
francs in notes were repaid each year consequent upon the government’s  reimbursement of its loans to the 
Banque. 
 
                                           M2 decrease                  Resulting decrease in private banks deposits  
                                           within 4 years         if no decrease in notes        if 3 b./.y notes repaid 
British growth                       -45%                                -100%                                  -56% 
French growth                       -24%                                 -56%                                    -8%    
 
 
     The next and most essential assumption affecting the debt/GDP ratio is the level of taxes. 
Contrary to Britain, France did not increase taxes during the war. Actually, even the nominal 
value of taxes decreased at the beginning of the war, and the 5,7 billion francs of taxes in 1918 
represented in real value around 40% less than the 4,3 billions of 1913. Taxes increased sharply 
in 1919, with the amount paid almost doubling (when prices increased by only 20%), but taxes 
represented only 11% of GDP (compared to 9% in 1913 but by contrast 16% in 1918 and 23% in 
                                                           
21  37 billion less (7 x 3) gives 16, of which 6 is slightly more than 35%.    20
1919 in Britain). We assume an increase of similar importance in 1920, bringing the tax/GDP 
ratio to 20%, and another significant increase in 1921, bringing it up to 25% (this is a higher level 
than that reached in Britain, and 50% higher than the highest reached in France during the 1920s). 
 
     Finally, we hypothesize about the evolution of public expenditure under a different monetary 
regime. We will assume that except for interest on the public debt (which path results from our 
assumption of imported interest rates and an optimistic consolidation scheme
22), other 
expenditures are maintained in real terms, in the sense that they are adjusted in nominal value for 
price fluctuations. We consider this choice as a reasonable compromise between the view that 
inflation decreased real expenditure (which was the case for civil servants salaries) so that 
deflation would have increased it; and the view which emphasizes the budgetary "laisser aller" 
resulting from the lack of a nominal monetary anchor.  
     One may argue that we do not give enough weight to reductions in expenditure as a solution to 
the deficit. It has often been argued that the compensations for wartime destruction had been 
subject to opportunism resulting in excessive State expenditure. This cannot be neglected since 
these compensations were the main reason for the rise in government expenditure (representing 
around 9% of GDP in 1920, 12% in 1921, 8% in 1922 and 7% in 1923 before decreasing rapidly  
(Blancheton, 2000, p.161)
23. Nevertheless, the existence of devastated regions for which national 
solidarity was required was a French (and not a British) problem so that imitating the British 
reduction in expenditure was much more difficult in France.  
          One should also notice that a substantial share of the compensations does not appear in 
government expenditure since it was financed through loans from the newly created Crédit 
National (which issued 15 billion francs of bonds between 1919 and 1922, more than 10% of 
1920 GDP). So we choose to maintain the real value of these expenditures in our stabilization 
scenario, and put the rest of the adjustment effort onto tax increases. 
                                                           
22 A last, mostly technical assumption concerns the structure of the public debt. It affects slightly the debt/GDP ratio 
via the budget deficit, but only up to the (small) difference between the interest rates on short term and long term debt. 
We assume that the short term debt is consolidated under the following scheme: instead of its actual evolution, it 
remains in 1919 at the 1918 peak value of 56 billion francs (instead of its actual level of 20 billion higher) and 
decreases thereafter by 10 billion a year up to 6 billion francs in 1924 and 0 afterwards. This is a relatively slow pace in 
comparison with the sharp reduction in the short-term debt that actually occurred after 1926. 
23  One should add that war pensions were also generously distributed, not only to soldiers but to their families. This 




     Using the equations estimated in the previous section and our assumptions discussed above 
about the evolution of the exogenous variables, we can simulate our counterfactual. One must 
remember that our assumptions are quite optimistic for the result of the stabilization
24. 
     One might have deduced from figure 4 that the debt level was not much more of a problem in 
France than in Britain (the debt/GDP ratio was 1.8 compared to 1.4 in 1919). In fact, that 
difference would have been greatly expanded by the consolidation process under the “British” 
scenario that we assume, because 1/ the “money overhang” was much more important (without 
already being entirely reflected in prices), and since much of the money creation corresponded to 
loans to the State, they had to be repaid if the stock of money had to decrease; 2/ public 
expenditures were so high that even sharp increases of taxes on the British model would not 
eliminate the deficit. 
     We show in figure 12 the likely paths of nominal debt under our assumptions and various 
hypotheses on the evolution of real GDP. Under the pessimistic one, France follows the British 
growth rate from 1919 on (this corresponds to the Keynesian thesis that considers the recession as 
the result of the stabilization). Under the optimistic one (in favor of which we give some 
arguments below), the French growth rate is not affected by the stabilization. We consider the 
case where the government is not able to raise the tax level as mentioned in our scenario in order 
to give an idea of the importance of this assumption
25. If one considers the most optimistic "Taxes 
and French growth" scenario, one may summarize the impact of our various assumptions in the 
following manner. The stabilization does not much affect the primary budget, except for the rise 
                                                           
24 This is the case for the structure of the model and of the assumptions about the exogenous variables. One might 
suppose that we have neglected the impact of our hypothetical scenario on the French government’s financial position 
vis-à-vis foreign countries, that is the value in our scenario's francs of German Reparations and interest payments on 
war debts to Britain and the US. In fact, by considering government revenues and expenditures in real terms, we 
considered most of their impact. To see this suppose that German Reparations were to follow the actual pattern in terms 
of gold marks. Converted into francs, they would bring a smaller amount of revenues to the French Treasury in our 
scenario, the difference being measured by the ratio of our hypothetical exchange rate to the actual one. This ratio does 
not differ much from the ratio of our hypothetical price level to the actual one, so that the impact of basing our 
calculation on the exchange rate would not add much to the result. The same is at least as true for interest payments on 
inter-allied debt, since their real value may better (in an ability to pay reasoning) be defined in terms of real francs 
(actual nominal payments divided by price level) as in terms of foreign currencies. One may also consider that we 
underestimated the role of foreign relations. We have been unable to find empirical evidence of a substantial role of 
foreign trade on output. This is contrary to the conventional wisdom, which says that the exchange rate depreciation 
and the real undervaluation of the franc during the inflation period had an important role in stimulating demand and 
promoting economic recovery. Furthermore, our scenario with a less undervalued franc is compatible with a higher 
trade deficit, which is necessary in order for foreign saving to finance part of the government debt consolidation 
process without endangering too much private investment. Finally, we neglect the various effects of a French 
stabilization on British growth and interest rates. The outcome might have been favourable, if considered as more 
cooperative. But this is highly speculative. 
25 We do not give it in the "British growth scenario", but in that case debt would clearly be even much higher.   22
in taxes, which is an essential feature, representing 61 billion francs more in public earnings from 
1919 to 1925 than was actually the case. The debt consolidation process  significantly affects the 
amount of interest paid on the public debt (9 billion francs less than the actual payments). The 
monetary consolidation (less recourse to monetary financing and reimbursement of 3 billion 
francs a year to the Banque de France) imposes the issuance of 26 billion francs more of public 
debt. One may conclude that even raising taxes enormously and benefiting both from a high 
growth rate and from low interest rates, the level of public expenditures and the necessary 
abandonment of monetary financing of the deficit made it impossible to significantly reduce the 
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Table 4: summary of the main impacts on public debt in the hypothesis of high growth 
 
 
This table shows the impact of the various assumptions in our scenario on public debt, cumulated 
from 1919 to 1925 (in billions francs). 
    Our  scenario   Actual     Relative  increase  (+)  or   
       amounts decrease  (-)  of  debt  in   
      (A)    (B)   the  scenario  (A  -  B) 
Primary  deficit    61,6    64    -  3,4 
(except for new taxes) 
New  taxes    -  61    0    -  61 
Interest on short term debt  12      28       -16 
Interest on long term debt  56      49       + 7 
Monetary  consolidation   26    0    +26   
Total  debt  increase   94,6    141    -46,4 
 
 
     If we turn now to the real side of the simulation (that of real GDP), we will observe that it will 
not play much of a role in our results. Because of the level of the nominal debt in our scenario, 
any reasonable assumption about the path of real GDP will imply an excessively high debt/GDP 
ratio. 
     The simulation of the wage level using equation 1 suggests a dramatic increase in real wages 
when prices decrease, followed by a slower decrease than in the British case (figure 13). This 
may reflect an overestimate of French nominal wage rigidity. Nevertheless, high rigidity of wages 
also appeared in the 1930s. Some observers explain this by the importance of independent labor 
in France compared to the case in Britain (which makes unemployment less of a threat to 
workers, with the resulting smaller impact on wages, and also a smaller impact through demand 
on GDP).   24
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        The heart of our simulation is the rate of growth of investment, from which we calculate the 
capital stock and GDP. Some simulations (figure 14) show that investment is very sensitive to the 
assumptions made about tax increases (mostly), the wage level or interest rates. H1 is our basic 
scenario; H2 to H5 are given in order to suggest the relative importance of the various effects we 
separated; H2 presents our scenario except for the impact of interest rates, considered as zero ; H3 
doubles the impact of all variables ; H4 shows our scenario except for the impact of real wages ; 
H5 gives it except for the impact of taxes
26. A comparison between our simulations of GDP, its 
actual path and the value it would have had under British-style growth (figure 15) shows, as our 
choice of model implied, that our model certainly underestimates the short term negative impact 
of an early stabilization on GDP (thus making it easier), and underestimates the long term growth 
of GDP (because it neglects productivity growth). It may also provide some argument in favor of 
a new classical interpretation of interwar history. At least, it suggests that the most important 






                                                           
26 There was actually much discussion among contemporaries on the impact of taxation on the economy, and the 
solution proposed was to concentrate it on the very beneficiaries of the deflation - - those rentiers with nominal fixed 
incomes. This was difficult not only because of their political clout - - taxing only public debt was too similar to a 
default, and taxing all assets was politically difficult and economically controversial.   25
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     This is confirmed by a look at the debt/GDP ratios in figure 16. We took as references the 
polar cases of French and British actual growth rates, since the most optimistic scenarios we 
simulated above for GDP were quite similar to the actual French path. We observe that in both 
cases the debt/GDP ratio rises above sustainable levels (it reaches 240% even in the most 
optimistic one), because even very high levels of taxation (such as in our main scenario) cannot 
entirely eliminate the budget deficits. This confirms that making the financial constraint less   26
binding depends more on financial or monetary reforms (including inflation) than on the 
economic situation. More importantly, no scenario is able to lower the debt/GDP ratio below 2, 
even after a decade of very tight budgetary policy. This suggests that following Britain was 
probably impossible in post-war France, even on the assumption that the French would have 
accepted a major increase in taxes and under optimistic assumptions about the reaction of the 
economy. This  
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outcome results mainly from the level of the public debt, the monetary overhang at the end of the 
war and the size of necessary public expenditures. 
 
5. A stabilization in 1924 
 
     The previous paragraphs show that no stabilization was possible in 1919. During the following 
years, the debt/GDP ratio decreased mainly during two short periods in 1920 and 1924-26. 
Stabilization occured after the second one. One might wonder whether it could have been realized 
earlier. In 1920-23, the political preference for a return to prewar parity made any attempt at 
stabilization unlikely to succeed. Nevertheless, market interest rates show that a stabilization 
including a limited devaluation was expected throughout 1920-1924 (Hautcoeur and Sicsic 1999). 
This solution became more likely in early 1924. The reasons for this include the facts that: the 
German hyperinflation had just made clear that Germany would not pay and inflation was a 
serious danger; the French Parliament accepted the plan to sharply raise most taxes (the "double 
decime", a 20% increase in all taxes), bringing the budget almost to balance; this helped Poincaré,   27
who was still the head of the government, to successfully stop a currency crisis (the pound rose 
up to 123 francs on March 8 and returned to 63 on April 23) ; opinions changed in favour of a 
stabilization recognizing a substantial devaluation of the franc (especially at the Treasury under P. 
de Mouÿ) (Blancheton 2000; Mouré 2002: 64ss) ; and the preparation of the Dawes Plan which 
created a favorable international environment even if it did not solve the problem of French debts 
to the Allies. 
    Consequently, we construct a stabilization scenario for April 1924, a scenario that Poincaré 
could have pursued would he have won the elections, and even if it had been done before the 
elections and he had lost, it is doubtful that the successor Cartel des Gauches would have 
abrogated it
27. Its main building blocks would be the following: stabilization at a level consistent 
with purchasing power parity, after which France would follow the path of British prices and 
interest rates.  
     A significant question is the level of the exchange rate to produce such a stabilization. We 
propose an exchange rate of 55 francs per pound sterling as the stabilization rate, since it is the 
one that Sauvy considered best corresponded to purchasing power parity
28. It is considerably 
below the mean rate of 75 for 1924 but near the April rate of 63, making a successful stabilization 
more difficult to achieve. Actually, a higher rate in terms of francs per pound would mean more 
depreciation of the franc, facilitating exports, lowering the interest rate compatible with interest 
rate parity, and so probably raising real GDP.  It would also eventually allow more room for price 
increases, thus raising nominal GDP. Both effects would decrease the debt/GDP ratio. Since we 
will demonstrate that a stabilization was possible in 1924, this hypothetical exchange rate makes 
proving our point more difficult and any other plausible rate would make stabilization easier to 
achieve.  
    For this exercise, we cannot use our previous model to simulate GDP since it was constructed 
in order to bias the result in favor of a successful stabilization. We propose instead to consider 
two paths for GDP. First, the pessimistic case, where the growth rate is assumed to be that of the 
UK after its own 1919 stabilization decision. Second, the optimistic case, in which the actual 
French growth rate is not modified. We believe that the "British" path would have been unlikely 
for France since poor British economic performance in the early 1920s reflected: in part the 
transition from the war economy to peacetime which was no longer the case in France in 1924; in  
part the international context (in 1921); and in part the deflationary policy followed by the British 
                                                           
27 Based on the observation that left wing parties are often strong supporters of financial orthodoxy, e.g. both the 
British and French experiences in the 1930's, and the French left proclamations in the 1920's.   28
(which is not considered to be the case in France since we only assume a stabilization of prices). 
We take this scenario as the "worst case".  
     In both cases, we assume that interest rates follow the British path, exactly as in the 1919 
scenario. New taxes would have been created so as to raise the tax/GDP ratio to 20% in 1924 and 
25% in the following years. This represents an important rise, although not such a jump as in the 
1919 stabilization scenarios, and it reinforces the idea that the real impact of the stabilization 
should be small. The short term debt is consolidated at the same rate as in the 1919 scenario (by 
10 billion francs a year beginning in 1924). 
    On the monetary front, the difference between this stabilization scenario and the 1919 situation 
is that, thanks to the flight from the currency in the years 1922-23, a stabilization leading to a  
M2/GDP ratio of 50% would require an increase of the money supply (figure 17). And since note 
issues represented only half of M2 at the end of 1923, a decrease of Banque de France loans to 
the government was not required. Such a stabilization law, we posit would have revalued the gold 
reserves (approximately from 5.5 to 11 billion francs), and the nominal profits gained would have 
been used to cancel part of the government debt, as it was the case in 1928. So the debt would be 
no more than 18 billion francs, half of the note issue. The gold reserve would then represent 
almost one third of the note issue of 37 billion francs. The decrease in the loans to the 
government would then have a purely psychological significance. One billion a year would be 
sufficient, and its negative impact on the budget would be compensated by its positive impact on 
monetary policy. Since M2 would not have had to decline, and the note issue would decrease, the 
Banque could relax slightly or at least not harden its monetary policy. This also suggests that our 
results are biased against a positive outcome from the stabilization.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 That is Sauvy's estimate of the PPP exchange rate at that moment. There has been considerable debate over the 
correct price indices to use to calculate PPP for that period, and discussions about purchasing power parity calculations 
in a context of important structural changes (since the prewar period). See Mouré (1996) and Sicsic (1992).   29
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     We calculate the path of the debt/GDP and deficit/GDP ratios in a combination of these 
hypotheses in figures 18 and 19. The debt/GDP ratio never rises above 2, even under the 
pessimistic growth scenario and even if no new taxes are collected. Moreover, since a better 
international environment in 1924 made it more likely for growth to be present than was the case 
in Britain in 1919, we must conclude that a stabilization was possible in 1924 in France, even at 
an ambitious exchange rate such as one half the prewar parity.  
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     We have estimated the impact of an early stabilization on the British model for the French 
economy under very optimistic assumptions: that France would immediately benefit from the low 
British level of long term interest rates and from price stabilization; that the budget deficit would 
be reduced with little or no cost; and that the impact of the stabilization on GDP would be very 
limited. 
     Our main conclusion is that such a stabilization was impossible because of the salient problem 
of the French economy after the war - - the excessive level of the public debt and the monetary 
overhang. Under any plausible assumptions, an early stabilization would have pushed the 
debt/GDP ratio well above 2 during many years, most likely an unsustainable level. The high debt 
ratio we argue makes our stabilization scenario quite unlikely because it would have damaged the 
government's credibility even were the serious distributive conflicts resolved. The apparent 
solution of a capital levy, which would have reduced the volume of the public debt, was not 
possible - - not only because of the general difficulties such a solution would have faced 
(described by Eichengreen, 1990), but also because the increase in the real value of private debt 
would likely have driven many businesses, and then many banks, to failure. 
            This suggests that not only political considerations but also economic (more precisely 
financial) constraints made an early stabilization on the British pattern impossible to realize in 
France, probably despite the willingness of many politicians and the Banque de France.    31
      Later on, a stabilization was politically difficult not only because it was only a pis-aller for 
believers of the franc Germinal but because there was no obvious (and then credible) level where 
the stabilization could be easily fixed. Nevertheless, we have shown, using both a detailed look at 
the chronology and counterfactual calculations similar to the preceeding ones, that the most 
virulent inflationary period, that of 1924-26, could have been avoided with a stabilization in 1924 
at a devalued parity of 55-75 francs per pound, a much higher rate than the 125 francs parity that 
would be fixed in 1928. Such a stabilization had became possible because the budget had been 
(almost) balanced and the debt had been deflated by inflation and growth. The French had also 
reduced their demands for German Reparations, which contributed to an easier international 
settlement. 
      One  would  be  wrong  to  consider  that the difference between our counterfactual 1924 
stabilization and the actual de facto stabilization of 1926 is not that great. However, a 1924 
stabilization would have had some important political advantages in the long term. France would 
have stabilized more or less in line with Britain and Germany. This would have reinforced her 
credibility and world position. Consequently, the Banque de France would not have had its vanity 
wounded by the dominant position of the Bank of England. It would have assisted in other 
European stabilizations, putting less pressure on Britain and building a more balanced and 
cooperative political system in Europe. The real exchange rate of the franc would have been more 
in line with that of the pound, limiting gold flows to France, the "international misallocation of 
gold", and the pressure on the international monetary system in the late 1920s. 
     The obstacles to such a beneficial stabilization were mostly political: within France, it implied 
one last tax increase which provoked sharp debates; it also required a less conservative Banque de 
France. But also, the obstacles were many outside France including: US isolationism and 
opposition to any new loan to France (in contrast with Germany); erroneous British fear of 
French domination in Europe; and British reluctance to share their monetary prestige. These 
obstacles contributed to make it impossible to achieve such a Pareto-improving cooperative 
solution. Perhaps had the IMF been in existence in the 1920s to provide the necessary funding, 
the outcome would have been very different, and the gold standard would be less remembered as 





   32
References 
 
Aftalion, A. (1927). Monnaie, prix et change. Paris. 
ANNHIST (2003) : a database for Banque de France statistics : http://www.banque-
france.fr/fr/stat/main.htm 
Bayoumi, T. and Bordo, M. D. (1998). ‘Getting Pegged: Comparing the 1879 and 1925 Gold 
Resumptions.” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 50 (January), pp. 122-149. 
Benjamin, D. and Kochin, L. (1979). ‘Searching for an Explanation of Unemployment in Interwar 
Britain’, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 441-78. 
Benjamin, D. and Kochin, L. (1982). ‘Unemployment and Unemployment Benefits in 20
th 
Century Britain: a Reply to our Critics’, Journal of Political Economy, 90, 410-36. 
Blancheton, B., Le Pape et l'Empereur, Albin Michel, 2000  
Bordo, M.D. and F.E. Kydland (1995). “The Gold Standard as a Rule: An Essay in Exploration.” 
Explorations in Economic History. 
Bordo, M.D., B. Eichengreen, D. Klingebiel, and M. S. Martinez-Peria (2001), “Is the Crisis 
Problem Growing More Severe?”  Economic Policy 32 (April), pp. 53-82. 
Bouvier J. (1984) "The french banks, inflation and the economic crisis, 1919-1939", The Journal 
of European Economic History, XIII (2), pp. 29-80. 
Broadberry, S. (1986) The British economy between the wars, Blackwell. 
Broadberry, S. and A. Ritschl (1995), "Real wages, productivity and unemployment in Britain 
and Germany during the 1920s", Explorations in Economic History 
Debeir, J.-C. (1980) "Inflation et stabilisation en France, 1919-1928", Revue Economique, XXXI, 
pp. 622-647. 
Eichengreen, B. (1992). Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, Oxford 
University Press, New York.   33
Eichengreen, B. (1990), “The capital levy in theory and practice”, in R. Dornbusch & M. Draghi, 
Public debt management: theory and history, Cambridge: CUP. 
Grotard, S. and P.-C. Hautcoeur (2001) "Taxation of corporate profits, inflation and income 
distribution in France, 1914-1926", mimeo. 
Hautcoeur, P-C. and P. Sicsic (1999) "Threat of a capital levy, expected devaluation and interest 
rates in France during the interwar period" European Review of Economic History, III, pp.25-56. 
James, H. (2001), The End of Globalization, Lessons from the Great Depression, Cambridge 
(Mass.) : Harvard University Press. 
Jeanneney, J-M, (1991) "Monnaie et mécanismes monétaires", in M. Lévy-Leboyer & J.-Cl. 
Casanova (eds), Entre l'Etat et le marché, Paris: Gallimard, pp. 289-329 
Keynes, J.M. (1929 & 1972). ‘The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill’, in The Collected 
Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. IX. Essays in Persuasion, London : MacMillan. 
Maizels, A. (1970) Growth and Trade, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 
Marseille J. (1980), “Les origines "inopportunes" de la crise de 1929 en France”, Revue 
économique, XXXI (4), pp.648-684.   
Mitchell, B.R. (1992) European Historical Statistics, New York : MacMillian. 
Mouré, K. (1996), "Undervaluing the franc Poincaré", Economic History Review, XLIX, 1, pp 
137-53 
Mouré, K., (2002) The Gold Standard Illusion, France, the Bank of France, and the International 
Gold Standard, 1914-1939, Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
Pollard, S. (ed.) (1970). The Gold Standard and Employment Policies Between the Wars, 
Methuen, London.   34
Th. Sargent (ed.) Rational expectations and inflation, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1986. 
Sauvy A., (1984) Histoire économique de la France entre les deux  guerres, Paris: Economica. 
Sicsic P., "Was the Franc Poincaré Deliberately Undervalued ?", Explorations in Economic 
History, 29, 1992, pp. 69-92. 
Temin, P. (1989) Lessons from the Great Depression, Cambridge (Mass.) : MIT Press.  
Thomas, T.J. (1981). ‘Aggregate Demand in the United Kingdom 1918-45’, in R. Floud and D.N. 
McCloskey (eds), The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, 2, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Villa P. (1995), Séries macro-économiques historiques (INSEE Méthodes, N°62-63, Paris, 1997), 
(or http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/villa/mode.htm). 
Webb, St. (1986), « Fiscal news and inflationary expectations in Germany after World War 1 » 














   35
APPENDIX: some details on the calculations and data 
 
 
Data for all the graphs in section 2 come from the database used in Bordo et al (2001) and  Mitchell (1992). 
Data for the estimations and simulations are from Villa (1997). The most debated data for the period are the 
budget deficit and the public debt. Available series for the debt include Sauvy (1984, vol.3, p. 16), Villa 
(1997) and Bonnefous (reproduced in Mouré, 2002, p.42). Differences are important (see graph. A1). We 
used Villa's series as being the most favourable to a stabilization in 1919 and the least one for a late 
stabilization. Budget deficit series include that of Villa (1997), and two series reproduced in Mouré (2002, 
p.42), from Bonnefous and from a Ministry of Finance archival document (B33985). 
 
The crucial element in the paper is the calculation of the amount of public debt. It is calculated using Villa's 
(1997) series DETTE (thereafter D), DGLT, DGCT (for total, long term and short term debts), AVANCES 
(for Banque de France's loans to the government (thereafter AV); and BFG (budget deficit). 
We have: DETTE = DGLT + DGCT 
In theory we should have BFGt = Dt - Dt-1 since debt is measured in nominal terms. In fact, some 
variations in the series of the debt level exceed the budget deficit of the corresponding year. This results 
from different sources for the two series. We decided to give a priority to the debt series, which can only 
minimize the debt level, going against our main point. So we added to the deficit the debt variations 
exceeding it
29.  
In order to calculate the values of BFG, DGCT, DGLT and D in our scenarios, we calculated a primary 
deficit. This supposed deducting interest paid on long and short term debt, which we estimated assuming 1/ 
that the long term debt in 1913 paid a 3% rate ; 2/ that every year's debt increase after 1913 paid that year's 
yield of the 3% rente, plus half a percentage point; and 3/ that short term debt always paid 5% interest. 
Knowing the deficit (BFG), we could calculate its value in our scenario, first by deflating its amount by the 
ratio of British to French prices (based on the assumed stabilization year), then by adding the value of new 
taxes, and the value of the consolidation of Banque de France loans (e.g. 3 billion a year, plus the deflated 
value of the actual growth of those loans, which should have been financed by the budget in our scenario). 
Adding to this hypothetical primary deficit the interest paid on the previous year's long term and short term 
debt allows us to calculate the hypothetical deficit BFG, and then to calculate Dt using Dt-1. Our hypothesis 
on the evolution of short term debt (stagnation in 1919, consolidation of 10 billion a year from 1920 on) 
allows us to calculate the long term debt (DGLT=D-DGCT). Using both, we calculate the amount of 
interest paid, which enters in the increase of D. This allows to take into account both the consolidation of 
short term debt and the decrease in budget deficits (thanks to new taxes) in the calculation of interest on the 
long term debt. 
                                                           
29 Nevertheless, we smoothed the evolution of these variations in the three years 1919-1921 (instead of -20, +6.7, -16.7, 
we put a constant -10 every year) in order to eliminate apparent shocks resulting only from problems in these series.   36
 
Then, we calculate our hypothetical primary deficit from our assumptions on short term debt (DGCT), 
interest rates paid on both long and short term debts, the evolution of government expenditures and existing 
ressources, and the creation of new taxes. Then, the budget deficit at t equals: 
Deft = INTLTt + INTSTt + PrimDeft - NTt - AV 
where Def is the deficit, INTLT interest paid on long term debt, INTST interest on short term debt and 
PrimDef is the primary budget deficit (PrimDef = G -T) (G represents public expenditures other  than 
interest payments and T taxes). NT are new taxes
30. AV is the variation of Banque de France loans (which 
provided a non-monetary resource, or which reimbursement increased the deficit. The evolution of the debt 
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30 What we call here new taxes are taxes above those actually created in the scenario above. Actual taxes were also 
raised significantly during the 1920's.   37
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